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This paper assesses the relationship between public and private wages in the EU, as
measured by general government and manufacturing compensations, respectively.
We find that the long-run relation between the two is stronger when the
government is a large employer. Manufacturing compensations are better
aligned with productivity and unemployment when general government
compensations, to which they generally respond, are set through bargaining. Finally,
manufacturing compensations react in the same way whether those in the general
government sector are increased or cut, a relation that seems to hold also under fiscal
consolidation provided the government is a large employer.
JEL Classification: C32, E24, E62, H59
Keywords: General government compensations, Wage setting, Cost competitiveness,
Fiscal consolidation, Co-integration1 Introduction
The Euro debt crisis has revived interest in the relation between fiscal policy and the
labour market. Vulnerable countries face the multiple challenge of fixing distressed
public finances, whilst having to improve cost competitiveness so as to reduce external
imbalances as well as reabsorb excessive unemployment. These objectives are generally
hard to reconcile, especially in high-debt countries where, for example, a fall in prices
would come with a rise in real debt levels. Under specific circumstances, though, a fis-
cal consolidation strategy based on cutting excessive government wage expenditures
could support cost competitiveness and possibly employment in the traded sector, if
changes in public wages spill over to the private traded sector. This very same trans-
mission channel is evoked in the fiscal-adjustment literature that has tried to quantify
the differentiated output effects of consolidations based on their composition (Perotti
1996; Alesina and Perotti 1997; Lane and Perotti 1998; Alesina et al 2002; Ardagna
2004).1 In parallel and more generally, a growing body of research has been looking at
the long- and short-run relation between government wages and the labour market
in “normal” times broadly finding that the two wages are indeed inter-related
(Afonso and Gomes 2014; Giordano et al 2011; Perez and Sanchez-Fuentes 2011;
Lamo, Perez and Schuknecht 2012, 2013).The Author(s). 2017 Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International
icense (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium,
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by general government and manufacturing nominal compensations, respectively, on a
sample of 17 European Union (EU) countries from 1980 to 2013 applying dynamic
ordinary least squares (DOLS) to panel data for the long-run and an error correction
model (ECM) for the short run. We focus specifically on the spill over of government
to manufacturing compensations so as to address the question of the possible effects of
certain fiscal policy measures on cost competitiveness via the supply side. Moreover,
attention is devoted to the manufacturing sector because much of the literature on
wage leadership is indeed concerned with the signalling that comes from wage bar-
gainers in the manufacturing sector. Our estimation strategy aims at determining the
strength of the relation between sectoral compensations across government sectors of
different size, at assessing whether the way in which government compensations are set
has any impact on the nature of the interaction with the private traded sector, and
finally at establishing whether such relation is symmetric holding both when govern-
ment compensations are increased and when cut and whether periods of large cuts (or
fiscal consolidations) make a difference. Whilst our focus is on the relation going from
general government to manufacturing compensations, we nonetheless also assess
interactions in the opposite direction as a way of validating our results.
From a policy perspective, that government compensations spill over to the
private sector is a non-trivial question. First of all, the strength and the persistence
of the spill over says something about the supply-side effects of aggregate demand
management, allowing for a more sophisticated modelling of the overall economic
impact of government spending. More to the point, the issue is especially relevant
in the euro area context where countries have lost the ability to recoup cost com-
petitiveness by means of devaluation but have scope to decide on the composition,
efficiency and equity of their government spending. Finally, our research provides
an indication of the relevance of wage setting modalities in the public sector. A
bargained model seems more efficient on the supply side but surely a definitive
answer requires additional research on the most satisfactory trade-off between
efficiency, equity and the need to achieve budgetary targets.
We add to the existing literature in three important respects. First, we explicitly con-
sider the role of government sector size and estimate whether government compensa-
tions exercise a stronger impact on the labour market when the government is a large
than when it is a small employer. This would mostly allude to an explicit market mech-
anism, an issue that has been only tangentially treated in the existing literature. Second,
we account for wage setting modalities in the government sector distinguishing
between compensations set by government decision and those set through collective
bargaining. Whilst largely ignored by the literature, the latter seems like a crucial issue
because it is an indication of the extent to which changes in government compensa-
tions are the result of exogenous fiscal policy decisions or rather part of the broader
economy-wide wage setting system. Third, we provide some evidence on whether the
spillover from the government to the private tradable sector is symmetric and whether
periods of fiscal consolidation make a difference.
We find that general government compensations exercise a long-term impact on
manufacturing compensations that is stronger for large public sectors. The long-run
sector-size effect disappears when looking at real compensations, independently of
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long-run relation is crucially affected by second-round effects via inflation. By contrast, in
the short-run, there is no size effect, with each 1% increase (fall) in government nominal
compensations leading on average to 0.25% increase (fall) in manufacturing compensa-
tions, independently of whether the general government is a large or a small employer, a
coefficient that is consistent with results from other studies (Afonso and Gomes 2014).
Having classified countries based on the prevailing public wage setting mode, we find
that the size of the spill over from the government to the tradable sector is not affected
by public wage setting neither in the long nor in the short run, but manufacturing
compensations are better aligned with productivity and more responsive to unem-
ployment when government compensations, to which private sector compensations
respond, are set via bargaining. This result may allude to the fact that any bargaining
process is “closer to the market” than unilateral government decision and hence closer
to what might happen in the private tradable sector.
We further look at whether the relationship between general government and manu-
facturing compensations is symmetric. We use an asymmetric ECM as in Granger and
Lee (1989) to verify whether the null hypothesis of symmetry is rejected against an
alternative of asymmetry. We find evidence of symmetry, with a change in real
government compensations leading to the same labour market effect independently
of whether the change consists of a rise or a fall in real government compensa-
tions. Moreover, it appears that government wage consumption and the labour
market tend to be decoupled under fiscal stress, unless the government sector is a
relatively large employer.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 1 reviews the literature on the
relation between, first, fiscal policy and competitiveness and, second, more generally,
on the public-private wage link. Section 2 describes our sample and empirical strategy.
Section 3 discusses the results. Section 4 looks at asymmetries and at the role of fiscal
consolidation episodes. Section 5 concludes.1.1 The public-private wage link in the literature
There is a well-established literature on the relationship between changes in govern-
ment wage expenditures, competitiveness and external positions. Lane and Perotti
(1998) show that a rise in government wage consumption reduces traded sector output
via a rise in private sector wages, which would lead to a deterioration in the current
account, if there exist adjustment costs that prevent consumption and investment of
traded goods from falling rapidly.2 Lane and Perotti (2003) find further evidence that
higher government wage spending impacts on the supply side by raising the real
product wage, thereby depressing profitability.3 To the extent that a rise in public
compensations is financed with resources drawn from the private sector that may take
the form of increased labour taxes, the literature on the impact of labour taxes on
private sector costs is equally relevant. So, for example, Alesina and Perotti (1997) look
specifically at the effects of changes in labour taxes on unit labour costs and find that
in a bargaining model higher labour taxes increase unit labour costs, unless wage
negotiations are conducted by a monopoly union that is large enough to internalise the
consequences of higher output prices on real consumption and employment.
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and Ardagna (2004) argue that fiscal adjustments based on a reduction in the
government wage bill induce a fall in real wages also in the private sector, thereby
improving profitability and investment. Along similar lines, Barrios and Langedijk
(2010) show that the downsizing of the government wage bill leads to more
successful fiscal consolidation specifically under fixed exchange rate regimes, where
the internal adjustment relies only on costs and prices, a result that is particularly
relevant in the euro area context.
More generally, there is a growing body of research that has looked at the long- and
short-run relationship between public and private wages in “normal” times, whether at
stake is co-movement, interaction or a clear causal link going from one sector to the
other, when for example, one of them is a wage leader. This research is less specific
about the origin of changes in public/private wages and mainly devoted to understand-
ing how different sectoral wages relate one to the other using a variety of statistical
techniques ranging from co-integration and error correction models to vector
autoregressive (VAR) systems or both.
Afonso and Gomes (2014) test the relationship between real general government and
private wages on a panel of 18 OECD countries using a simple 2SLS estimation and
allowing for an error correction term. Their analysis is mostly about the interaction
between public and private wages and provides only indirect evidence on causality.
They find that the interaction goes both ways and that each 1% increase in real public
sector wage growth raises private sector real wage growth by 0.3%. Lamo et al. (2007,
2012, 2013) use different statistical techniques to analyse co-movement in the short-,
medium- and long-term but include also a causality test. They find strong cross-
sectoral correlation between public and private wages, with coefficients as high as 0.8.
To test causality, they implement a standard Granger causality test in a VAR framework
and find that generally private wages have a stronger impact on public wages than vice
versa. More specifically, the public sector acts as a wage leader only in the Netherlands
and plays an important role, though not as far as leading, in Greece, Italy, Portugal and
Finland. Finally, they juxtapose cross-country heterogeneity in coefficients to institu-
tional settings and find that the role of the public sector is stronger, the greater the
government’s involvement in collective bargaining, the larger the public sector and the
lower the competition from outside. Perez and Sanchez-Fuentes (2011) analyse the
short-term relation between public and private wages in a VAR framework and find
evidence of signalling especially by the private sector including early on during actual
wage negotiations.
These studies are generally not explicit about the exact transmission channel from
one sector to the other and tend to capture different dynamics that are at play at the
same time. Results can be interpreted more easily if one or more potential transmission
channels are first identified and then modelled in the empirical analysis. This is one of
the specific objectives of the present paper. We identify below potential market-driven
and institutional channels, stressing which ones would be more relevant for the
interaction going from the government to the private sector and which ones matter
for movements in the opposite direction. Subsequently, we propose a simple
method for testing empirically the strength of the market channel as well as of
one specific institutional channel.
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vate sector, various channels may operate. First, large swings in public wages
alter the supply of labour available to the labour market, inducing a change in
the equilibrium wage if the labour market is perfectly competitive and in the
absence of impediments to mobility. This is likely to be always true in the
long-run with the two wages expected to be co-integrated with a slope coeffi-
cient of one. Second, rising public wages may crowd out private employment,
increasing average productivity and thus wages in the private sector (Algan
et al. 2002). Third, changes in public wages affect the outside option of union-
ized private sector workers, putting pressures on the bargaining process (Afonso
and Gomes 2014), even when public and private employment remain separate.
Fourth, changes in public wages that are compensated by an adjustment in
labour taxation would mechanically alter private labour costs (Holmlund 1993;
Forni and Giordano 2003). Indirectly, they may even alter wage demands if the
wage bargaining system is such that wage setters have no incentive to internal-
ise the consequences of their actions—i.e. where there is no centralization in
wage bargaining (Alesina and Perotti 1997).
Similar albeit not identical transmission channels may be identified for the poten-
tial spill over going in the opposite direction, namely from the private to the pub-
lic sector. First, wage bargaining in the private sector can have demonstration
effects, whether it is the same union negotiating both wages or whether there are
two different unions (Maffezzoli 2001; Ardagna 2007). Confirming this hypothesis,
Perez and Sanchez-Fuentes (2011) find evidence of signalling by the private sector
already in the negotiation phase for France and Germany in the period before
1999. Second, numerous EU countries have wage bargaining practices that grant
wage leadership to the private sector. This is the case of the so-called Scandinavian
wage determination model, with the exposed sector acting as leader or pattern
setter for all other sectors including the government (see also Holm-Hadulla et al.
2010). Third, established practices can make public wages responsive to private
ones. For example, in the Netherlands, there is a formal rule imposing that the
growth rate of private wages is automatically applied to public sector wages
(Hartog and Oosterbeek 1993).
We propose to isolate any market-driven mechanism by accounting for government-
sector size, where the assumption is that the larger the role of the general government
sector as an employer, the stronger the impact on the labour market via both prices
and quantities. The underlying assumption is that in the long-run, there is no impedi-
ment to cross-sectoral mobility that could create a disconnect between government
and traded sector compensations. When it comes to institutional channels, however,
we expect much greater cross-country heterogeneity, which complicates the exercise of
finding a common testable hypothesis. Wage-setting practices would formally or infor-
mally grant wage leadership to one or the other sector, where the most common
practice is that the exposed sector acts as a pattern setter for the rest of the economy.
The reverse situation where private sector compensations follow those in government
sector is less common. Would that happen, the possible institutional channels of trans-
mission are imitation effects inducing private sector unions to follow public sector
unions or fairness effects for which an “all-sector” union tends to negotiate similar
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crucial dimension is likely to be the nature of public wage setting, namely whether
general government compensations are set by government decision or by collect-
ive bargaining, with the institutional transmission channels described above oper-
ating in the case of bargaining only. Our strategy is thus to distinguish between
compensations set by the government itself and those agreed through collective
bargaining. That way, we should be able to isolate the operation of the ins-
titutional transmission channels and possibly differentiate them from alternative
more market-driven channels.
2 Data and empirical strategy
For the public sector, we use general government compensations from the OECD
Economic Outlook constructed by dividing general government final wage con-
sumption expenditures (CGW) by general government employees (EG).4 Figures on
general government are drawn from the System of National Accounts (SNA) and
refer to public offices at all levels of government, non-market publicly owned
hospitals, schools and social security organizations. We obtain comparable data for
a sample of 17 EU countries over 1980–2013.5 We approximate the traded sector
by manufacturing.
In the long-run, nominal compensations in the two sectors should be co-
integrated with a slope coefficient of one. To systematically analyse long- and
short-run effects of general government compensations on the manufacturing sec-
tor, a co-integration approach is developed in a panel-data setting linking manufac-
turing compensations to a number of determinants, including compensations in
the general government sector. The long-run relation is estimated in levels using
dynamic ordinary least squares (DOLS), whilst the error correction mechanism
(ECM) representation allows estimating the short-run relation between compensa-
tion growth, shocks in explanatory variables and the deviation from the dynamic
long-run relation.
The long-run wage (compensation) equation should be interpreted as an equilibrium
relation and is specified as:
lnwit ¼ αi þ β1lnwpit þ β2lnprit þ β3uit þ β4lncpiit þ εit ð1Þ
where i and t are the index country and time, respectively, w denotes the level of nom-
inal compensation per employee in the manufacturing sector, wp is the level of nominal
compensation per general government employee, pr is the real value added per person
employed in the manufacturing sector, u is the unemployment rate, cpi is the consumer
price index, and ε is the error term. All variables are in logs except for the unemploy-
ment rate. Compensations in the manufacturing sector are expected to be positively
related to government compensations, prices and labour productivity and negatively
related to unemployment. Co-integration is tested using DOLS with one lag and
one lead for each regressor. We include country fixed effects not only to control
for time-invariant country-specific factors but also because some variables are
expressed as index numbers and would thus not be comparable across countries
unless they are transformed.
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specified as follows:
Δlnwit ¼ δi þ θ1Δlnwpit þ θ2Δlnprit þ θ3Δuit þ θ4Δlncpiit þ γ e^it−1 þ εit ð2Þ
where ê is the lagged error correction term and all other variables except unemploy-
ment are expressed in log changes. A significant and negatively signed error correction
term is taken as evidence of co-integration between government and manufacturing
compensations; its coefficient captures the speed of adjustment back to equilibrium
(see Table 6 in the Appendix).
3 Results
3.1 The long-run effects of government sector size
Table 1 shows the results of the long-run (column 1) and short-run (error-correction)
wage equation (column 2) estimated on the whole sample. With the exception of theTable 1 Long-run and short-run relation between manufacturing and general government
compensations per employee, EU countries 1980–2013
(1) (2)
Dynamic long-run relation Error correction model
Dependent variable: log of manufacturing compensation per employee, level (long-run relation) and
change (ECM)
Δ log government compensations p.e. 0.249***
[7.117]
Δ log productivity in manufacturing 0.188***
[5.426]
Δ unemployment rate −0.00162*
[−1.578]
Δ log consumer price index 0.693***
[19.51]
Log of consumer price index 0.687***
[9.410]
Log of government compensations p.e. 0.435***
[7.968]










Number of countries 17 17
Estimation method: dynamic OLS with fixed effects and Newey West standard errors and ECM with standard errors
robust with respect to heteroskedasticity and non-independence within country clusters. Sample: EU countries, except
AT, BG, CY, DE, EL, HR, LT, LV, MT, RO and SI
Robust t-statistics: ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1
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significant. The ECM equation shows that deviations from the long-term relation
are corrected over time, as indicated by the negative and significant coefficient of
the error correction term, which is indeed supportive of co-integration amongst
the variables. Moreover, the short-term response of manufacturing compensation
growth has the expected sign for all the variables and is significant also for the
unemployment rate. It is found that every 1% increase in general government
compensations is associated, in the long-run, with a 0.4% increase in manufactur-
ing compensations.6 Short-run effects are slightly weaker at almost 0.25%. Our
results are in line with those of analyses that have used similar estimation tech-
niques (Afonso and Gomes 2014).
Our first hypothesis is that the relationship between nominal compensations
in the government and those in the manufacturing sector is importantly condi-
tioned by size, here measured by the ratio of general government to total em-
ployment. The greater the importance of the government sector as an employer,
the more likely that changes to government compensations affect average condi-
tions on the market and mostly so in the long-run when inter-sectoral mobility
can be considered to be unconstrained. In order to test for the operation of this
market-based channel, the EU sample is split in two groups: countries in which
the average share of government to total employment is above the whole
sample’s median and countries where it is below the median.7 Table 2 provides
results for the two groups. It is found that manufacturing and government
compensations share a significant long-run relationship especially in large
government sectors: for each 1% rise in government compensations, manufactur-
ing compensations grow by 0.7% when the government is a large employer, but
by only 0.2% when it is a small employer.
The relation goes both ways. When testing it in the other direction, namely from
manufacturing to general government compensations, it is found that the long-run
elasticity of government with respect to manufacturing compensations is of 0.8%,
thus much stronger than the 0.4% elasticity of manufacturing with respect to gen-
eral government compensations. This confirms results from, for example, Lamo
et al. (2007) (2012), where it is found that the private sector is more likely to have
an impact on the public sector than vice versa, including in the long-run when co-
variates are accounted for. Secondly, in line with expectations, we find no differ-
ence between large and small government sectors; as a matter of fact, this
dimension should be relevant only when it comes to assessing the impact of the
public on the private traded sector.8
By splitting the sample in two groups, we are de facto assuming two completely
separate regimes and hence isolate the size of the spill over for each of them. We
do not expect that the size of the government sector has significant marginal
effects on the inter-sectoral spill over but that after a certain threshold level, the
spill over from one sector to another is more important.9 Still, as part of our
robustness checks, we have also interacted government compensations with a
dummy that captures above-median government sectors finding that the relation-
ship between government and manufacturing compensations is indeed amplified
when the government is an important employer.10
Table 2 Long-run and short-run relation between manufacturing and government compensations
per employee, conditional on the size of the government sector, EU countries 1980–2013
(1) (2) (3) (4)











































Constant −1.018*** −3.082*** 0.0128*** 0.00308
[−6.271] [−11.37] [4.651] [0.995]
Observations 193 214 193 214
R2 0.9 0.991 0.514 0.740
Number of countries 8 9 8 9
Estimation method: dynamic OLS with fixed effects and Newey West standard errors and ECM with standard errors
robust with respect to heteroskedasticity and non-independence within country clusters. Sample: EU countries, except
AT, BG, CY, DE, EL, HR, LT, LV, MT, RO and SI
Robust t-statistics: ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1
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The second proposition we put to the test is that public wage setting may potentially have a
bearing on the nature of the relationship between government and manufacturing compen-
sations. We isolate two possible regimes, one which wages set by government decision and
one where these are set through collective bargaining. In the case of the former, we would
be mostly capturing the effects of a fiscal policy decision (or shock) on the labour market,
which should be independent of whether the labour market is competitive or uncompetitive
as discussed in Jackman et al. (1992). In the case of bargaining, the relation between public
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country. Here, high cross-country variation is more likely. In some countries, public and
private wages are negotiated by the same union. In others, they are negotiated by different
unions but each tends to imitate the other, for example, through envy effects (Maffezzoli
2001; Ardagna 2007). In some other countries, there is an explicit institutional mechanism
in place that grants wage leadership to one or the other sector, resulting in high bargaining
coordination. We limit ourselves to distinguishing between wages set unilaterally by the
government and those agreed by the government together with employees’ representatives
in a bargaining framework against the assumption that, for example, mechanisms such as
imitation or envy effects are present only in the case of bargained wages.
To test for the role of public wage-setting regimes, the sample is thus split in two
groups: countries where government wage setting takes place via collective bargaining
and where government wages are set by legislative decisions. Countries are classified
based on the predominant wage determination regime.11 Table 3 displays the results.Table 3 Long-run and short-run relation between manufacturing and government compensations
per employee, conditional on government wage setting model, EU countries 1980–2013
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dynamic long-run relation Error correction model
Bargaining Decision Bargaining Decision
Dependent variable: manufacturing compensations, level and change (log)
Δ log government compensations p.e. 0.360*** 0.215***
[6.745] [5.980]
Δ log productivity in manufacturing 0.156** 0.218***
[3.324] [4.935]
Δ unemployment rate −0.00210* −0.00155
[−2.199] [−1.405]
Δ log consumer price index 0.629*** 0.705***
[6.781] [24.51]
Log of consumer price index 0.458*** 0.705***
[5.945] [7.019]
Log of government compensations p.e. 0.528*** 0.481***
[9.669] [5.083]
Log of productivity in manufacturing 0.241*** 0.0941**
[11.28] [2.191]
Unemployment rate −0.00676*** 0.00166
[3.875] [0.621]
Lagged error correction term −0.146*** −0.142**
[−3.670] [−2.891]
Constant −0.753*** −2.367*** 0.00593* 0.00639**
[−5.667] [−6.757] [1.905] [2.456]
Observations 224 183 224 183
R2 0.993 0.987 0.637 0.643
Number of countries 8 9 8 9
Estimation method: dynamic OLS with fixed effects and Newey West standard errors and ECM with standard errors
robust with respect to heteroskedasticity and non-independence within country clusters. Sample: EU countries, except
AT, BG, CY, DE, EL, HR, LT, LV, MT, RO and SI
Robust t-statistics: ***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1
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facturing compensations appear to be considerably less reactive to productivity
and to unemployment over the long-run in countries where public wages are set
by the government. This result could be linked to the fact that public sector wages
set unilaterally by the government are less likely to reflect market forces wea-
kening the link between manufacturing compensations, labour productivity and
unemployment dynamics.
As above, we split the sample in two groups so as to assume that public wage-setting
modalities produce two completely separate regimes. We have also here interacted
government compensations with a dummy that captures bargaining regimes and
obtained a result similar to the one obtained from the split sample with a significant
interaction term that indicates a positive but quantitatively trivial difference in the size
of the spill over when wages are bargaining compared to when they are set by
government decision.123.3 Fiscal consolidation and asymmetries
Understanding the relationship between government wage consumption and the labour
market is especially relevant in the current European context. Pre-crisis macroeco-
nomic imbalances have been driven by prices and costs in the non-tradable sector
spilling onto the exposed sector, especially in countries such as Ireland and Portugal
(Blanchard 2007). In the bust, in almost all euro area countries under stress, fiscal
consolidation plans rested on a reduction or freeze in the government wage bill,
whether achieved via wage and/or employment cuts or freezes.
Fiscal consolidations are “extraordinary times”. It is likely that under conditions of
fiscal distress not only are wage setting practices in the government sector affected
under a sense of urgency but it may also be that the interplay between government and
private sector compensations is somehow altered. Table 4 displays correlations between
nominal government compensation growth and manufacturing compensation growth
under alternative fiscal conditions.13 This preliminary evidence suggests that govern-
ment and manufacturing compensations are less closely correlated in periods whereTable 4 Correlation between government and manufacturing compensations’ growth under




Large public employer 0.81*
Small public employer 0.20
Non-consolidation
Large public employer 0.79*
Small public employer 0.83*
Sample: EU countries (excluding AT, BG, CY, DE, EL, LT, LV, MT, RO, SI) over 1980–2012 (1995–2012 in the case of CZ, EE,
HU, SK). Fiscal consolidations are defined as a change in the structural balance of at least 1.5% of GDP in 1 year or of at
least 3% of GDP over a 3-year period, with at least 0.5% improvement in each year. For the years where structural balance
data are not available in the AMECO database, the primary cyclically adjusted budget balance is used. Countries are split
according to their government size on the basis of the average share of government to total employment (countries with an
average value above the median are classified with a large government sector). Source: OECD Economic Outlook
*Pearson correlation coefficients at least p < 0.05
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government wage consumption is mainly dictated by the objective of reducing govern-
ment deficits and therefore less likely to co-move with the private traded sector. How-
ever, the evidence also shows that in countries with a relatively large government
sector, the correlation remains strong also during episodes of fiscal consolidation.
The evidence presented above is but only suggestive. So as to derive more robust
information about how different sectoral compensations relate to one another in good
versus bad times, we introduce an asymmetric ECM as in Granger and Lee (1989) to
determine whether the response of manufacturing compensations to changes in general
government compensations is asymmetric, varying depending on whether government
compensations are increased or cut. To do so, we use real instead of nominal compen-
sations so as to have a sufficient number of negative values. We apply the same meth-
odology as for previous specifications but split the error correction term into positive
and negative values and run two separate (short-run) wage equations. The null hypoth-
esis of symmetry would be rejected if the coefficients on the positive and negative
values of the error correction term are significantly different. Table 5 presents the
results. The coefficients on the positive and the negative values of the error correction
term are not significantly different, which implies that a cut in real government
compensations is transmitted to the labour market in the same way as an increase.14
We further split the group with negative values of the errors into large and small
government sectors and find that, at least in normal times, the strength at whichTable 5 Asymmetric short-run relation between manufacturing and government compensations
per employee, EU countries 1980–2013
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Error correction model Error correction model (−)





0.412** 0.409** 0.386* 0.413**
[7.392] [6.114] [3.078] [7.143]
Δ productivity in manufacturing 0.285** 0.300** 0.347** 0.222
[3.497] [3.852] [4.409] [1.547]
Δ unemployment rate −0.00226* −0.00234 −0.00347* −0.000848
[−2.205] [−1.641] [−2.414] [−0.469]
Lagged error correction term (+) −0.314**
[−2.963]
Lagged error correction term (−) −0.330** −0.253+ −0.354**
[−4.296] [−2.257] [−4.276]
Constant 0.0228** 0.00974** 0.0135** 0.00825
[5.549] [4.193] [5.669] [1.826]
Observations 407 407 193 214
R2 0.314 0.319 0.429 0.255
Number of countries 17 17 8 9
Estimation method: dynamic OLS with fixed effects and Newey West standard errors (not shown) and ECM with standard
errors robust with respect to heteroskedasticity and non-independence within country clusters. Sample: EU countries,
except AT, BG, CY, DE, EL, HR, LT, LV, MT, RO and SI
Robust t-statistics: **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05, +p < 0.1
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size of the public sector.15
4 Conclusions
We have found that there are significant inter-linkages between compensations in the
general government and in the manufacturing sector both in the long and in the short
run. The long-run relation between government and manufacturing compensations
wages is much stronger when the government is a large employer, a result that appears
to be driven mainly by second-round effects via inflation. The other important finding
is that in countries where government wages are set by collective bargaining, manufac-
turing compensations tend to be better aligned with productivity and to be more
responsive to unemployment, possibly because bargaining processes are generally closer
to the market than unilateral government decisions. Finally, the reaction of manufac-
turing compensations to changes in government compensations is found to be symmet-
ric. Such symmetry is unaffected by the size of the public sector. Nevertheless, under
fiscal consolidation episodes, the two nominal compensations are correlated only when
the government is a large employer, possibly alluding to the effect on prices and wages
of some types of expenditure-based fiscal consolidations.
The linkages highlighted here are not meant to capture causality; nevertheless, they
still offer some insights into understanding the possible labour market impact of
changes in the government wage bill. Our evidence is suggestive of the fact that wage-
bill-based fiscal consolidations can affect the external sector leading to competitiveness
improvements and possibly to an adjustment of macroeconomic imbalances. By con-
trast, our analysis is unfit to quantify the extent to which the composition of budget
consolidation contributes to cushioning negative output effects of fiscal adjustment via
the demand channel. One secondary implication is that the sequencing of fiscal consol-
idations in a monetary union should be set in such a way to allow each member state
to fully benefit from potential supply-side effects via the labour market. Finally, we
contribute to unpacking the effects of government wage consumption by accounting
for the institutional setting against which public wages are set. Our evidence seems to
suggest that bargaining is generally more efficient in terms of its effects on the labour
market. Nevertheless, this is a new unexplored topic that would deserve greater atten-
tion and additional work so as to better capture the conditions for an optimal trade-off
between efficiency, equity and the need to respect budgetary targets.
Endnotes
1In this paper, we are not concerned with output effects from fiscal consolidation
strategies, but simply aim at verifying whether the evoked labour-market channel is
actually operating, irrespective of its contribution to the size of fiscal multipliers.
2A strong assumption underpinning the analysis is that the domestic economy is too
small to affect the demand for traded goods, which implies that the domestic traded
sector is subject only to foreign demand and that fiscal policy shocks of this kind
operate solely via the supply channel.
3However, it is found that the impact on quantities such as output and employment
is smaller, which suggests a limited pass-through from costs to prices in the presence
of positive fiscal shocks.
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sector. Yet, disaggregation by type of occupation, hours worked as well as the public
wage distribution relative to that of the private sector are not expected to interfere with
our twofold research questions, i.e. whether public sector size and wage bargaining
modes bear an impact on the interaction between public and private wages.
5The only exception is Ireland, where general government data include public
enterprises.
6The multivariate setting possibly explains a coefficient that is significantly lower
than one.
7The existing literature has analysed the issue of size only in a cursory fashion.
For example, Lamo et al. (2007, 2012) include public sector size amongst the
variables that may affect the odds of public wage leadership and find that the
government is more likely to Granger-cause private wages when it is a large
employer. We differ from their approach in two respects. First, we are merely
concerned with the relation (or interaction) between the two wages not with lead-
ership (or causality). Second, we go beyond probability analysis and quantify the
spill over from the public to the export-oriented sector by estimating separate wage
equations for large and small government sectors.
8Results of the response of government to manufacturing wage levels and growth
rates are not shown. The estimated wage equation includes general government
compensations per employee as dependent variable and, as regressors, compensations
per employee in manufacturing, a proxy for labour productivity in the government
sector, the consumer price index and the unemployment rate.
9Quantifying the exact size of this threshold level goes beyond the scope of the
present paper.
10The results are available upon request.
11For a description of national public wage-setting systems, see European Commission
(2014), p. 11. It should be noted though that the classification aims at capturing the
predominant regime, whilst some countries have in fact hybrid systems, with, for example,
the government setting wages by decree but only after extensive consultations with unions
(e.g. Austria). It should be noted though that our sub-sample does not include obvious
hybrid systems.
12The results are available upon request.
13By convention, episodes of fiscal consolidation are defined as those where the
structural primary balance improves by at least 1.5% of GDP in 1 year or at least
3% in 3 years, with a minimum of 0.5% improvement in each year. Such a defin-
ition permits to isolate both cases of “cold shower” consolidation episodes and
more gradual consolidation episodes.
14This is generally true also in the normal ECM. When running estimations (1) and
(2) on real instead of nominal compensations, we do not obtain significantly different
results except for the fact that there is no public sector size effect neither in the long
nor in the short run, which may allude to the fact that the long-term elasticity of
manufacturing to government wages is significantly driven by second-round effects
via inflation.
15Under fiscal stress, however, government and manufacturing wages tend to be
better aligned when the public sector is relatively large (see Table 4).
Marzinotto and Turrini IZA Journal of European Labor Studies  (2017) 6:2 Page 15 of 16AppendixTable 6 List of variables
Variable Definition Source
Nominal compensations per employee
in the general government
Calculated as the ratio of government
final wage consumption expenditures
(CGW) to government employment (EG)
OECD Economic Outlook
Real compensations per employee in
the general government
Deflated by the price deflator of GDP
at market prices
AMECO
Nominal compensations per employee
in the manufacturing sector
Calculated as the ratio of total
compensations of employees
to total employees in the
manufacturing industry
Eurostat
Real compensations per employee
in the manufacturing sector
Deflated by price deflator of
gross value added in the
manufacturing industry
AMECO
Productivity Gross value added at 2005
prices per person employed
Eurostat
Consumer price index National consumer price index
for all items
AMECO
Unemployment rate Standardized unemployment rate Eurostat
Government sector size Ratio of general government
to total employment
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